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At 5:00 A.M. on Sunday, the sleepy prisoners of 
war were abruptly surprised by the glare from 
searchlights mounted on tanks surrounding the com­
pouhd. Soldiers barged in, followed by a convoy of 
trucks. The prisoners were lined up, searched, and 
loaded lying face downward onto the trucks. With 
well-armed guards beating any of the prisoners who '
moved, the trucks drove to the railhead where .the.
prisoners were unloaded i.nto waiting cattle cars. The 
empty trucks returned and picked up load afte~ load. 
When all 3000 prisoners had been stuffed aboard, the 
train carted them off for eventual transfer to slave­
. 

labor camps or to be executed. The date was 
Febru ary 1946. The location was Plattl ing, a town in 
Bavaria, Germany. The prisoners were Russian, but 
the soldiers were not German. They were Americans 
of the 101st Airborne Division who were engaging in 
an operation that became commonplace in Europe at 
the close of World War II. For the Russian prisoners 
were refugees from Stalin's dictatorship, remnants of 
the Second KONR Division of Vlasov's anti-Commu­
nist army. They were being repatriated, by force, to 
the Soviet authorities as part of what was officially 
labeled, after one of the most severe forms of torture 
ever used aboard sailing ships, OPERATION KEEL­
HAULI 
Smith Hempstone, in his review of Solzhenitsyn's 
The Gulag Archipelago, 1918·1956, estimates that 
"Not one American in 100,000 has heard of 'Opera· 
tion Keelhaul' ..." So far as I know, until the 
publication of Julius Epstein's volume, information 
on ' Operation Keelhaul could only be found in this 
country in a few scattered articles from newspapers 
and magazines and also in three books: Our Secret 
Allies, Eugene Lyons' history of Russian opposition 
to Communism; The East C8me West, Peter J . 
Huxley-Blythe's account of the Cossacks during the 
War; and The Politician, Robert Welch's treatise on 
Eisenhower. During the. fervor that accompanied the 
Second World War, the United States Government 
assumed d ictatorial and awesome powers, even by 
today's standards, and that is perhaps why no other 
period offers so many undisclosed skeletons in the 
closet-scandals covered-up or glossed over. The case 
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of Tyler Kent, the Sedition Trials, the provoking of 
the Pearl Harbor attack, the concentration camps for 
Japanese-Americans, and many others that might be 
mentioned; all are events involving raw and brutal 
state power or perfidy, and yet the details of none of 
them are even today generally known. But of all the 
shocking and yet unknown crimes perpetrated by the 
:u.s. Government during World War II, Operation 
Keelhaul ~undoubtedly the most massive. Its 
victims were e tho sands of refugees, both soldiers 
and civilians teeing~....the West from the successful 
advance of e Red armies through Eastern Europe. 
Th$£iwek hoping to escape Communist tycanny and 
fi lum, but instead they were all collected by 
the Allied ar111ies and forcibly repatriated into the 
anxious arms of the Soviets. 
OPERATION KEELHAUL By Julius Epstein. Old 
Greenwich: The Devin·Adair Co. 1973. 255 pp. 
$8.95. 
THE LESSER EVIL 
· Like the prisoners at Plattling, many of those 
forcibly repatriated were Russians who had fought in 
German uniforms. When the German armies had first 
invaded the Soviet Union, many Russians considered 
the event a golden opportunity for overthrowing 
Stalin and liberating Russia. Even after Hitler disillu· 
sioned them by implementing . Rosenberg's cruel and 
insane Ostpolitik, there were still a good number who 
felt that German oppression was the lesser of two 
evils. Further, many officers of the · Wehrmacht 
disagreed with the Ostpolitik, and it wasn't very long 
before OKH headquarters was silently tolerating the 
employment of Russian deserters and prisoners of 
war, first as support troops, where they came to be 
known as Hilfsfreiwillige, and later as combat troops, 
" who were called Osttruppen. 
In 1uly of 1942, the Germans captured- General 
Andrei A. Vlasov, a Soviet war hero who had been 
awarded the Order of the' Red Banner for his 
successful defense of Moscow from the initial German 
onslaught. By the time of his capture, Vlasov had 
become so disenchanted with the Soviet system that 
he proposed to the Gelll)ans that they help him 
recruit and lead a Russkaya Osvoboditelnaya Armis 
(ROA), Russian Army of Liberation. VIBSOv's propo­
sals did succeed in gaining a few concessions from the 
Ostpolitik: the Osttruppen were given official sanc­






men, and even issued ROA insignia. However, the 
ROA was never allowed to organize above the 
battalion level and, for the most part, was humiliated 
and shoved around by being subordinated and sub­
merged within lar.Qer German units. Vlasov was given 
no real authority; . instead, he was subjected to 
unceasing but mostly unsuccessful attempts to use 
him for propaganda purposes and to get him to 
glorify Hitler and his racist doctrines. Finally, most of 
the ROA units were transferred to the Western Front, 
where they never wanted to fight in th.e first place. 
By 1944, however, tt\e Germans had become 
desperate, and they were prepared to give Vlasov free 
rein. A Komitet Osvobozhdenia -Narodov Rossii 
(Committee for the Liber~ion of the Peoples of 
Russia) was formed, and three KONR divisions 
totaling 50,000 troops we e organized. They saw 
some action against Stalin's.armies, but unfm-tunately •
not before Germany was in the final stages of colla~ 
and the situation beyond hope. Vlasov, to save his 
men from annihilation, concentrated them toward 
Austria in order to surrender to the Americans. ( 11 
The position the Allies should have taken toward 
Vlasov's men and the ROA generally, the position 
demanded by the Geneva Convention, was made clear 
by Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew in a note to 
the Soviet Attache in Washington just before the 
Yalta Conference opened: 
In regard to the status of the Soviet nationals 

under discussion, I feel I must in all sincerity 

rein ind you that they were not captured by 

American forces while they were detained in 

German prisoners of war camps but were serving 

· Germany in German military formations in 

German uniforms. ... 

We cannot repatriate these people because this 

would be a gross violation of the Geneva 

Convention. They were captured in German 

uniforms, and the Geneva Convention does not 

permit us to look behind the uniform.... 

It appears to the appropriate American authori· 

ties who have given most careful consideration 

to this situation, that the clear intention of the 

Convention is that prisoners of war shall be 

treated on the basis of the uniforms they are 

\'Yearing, and ... the containing powers shall not 

look behind the uniforms to determine ultimate 

questions of ci~izenship or nationality.... 

There are numerous aliens in the United States 

Army, including citizens of enemy countries. 

The United States Government has taken the 

position that these persons are entitled to the 

full protection of the Geneva Convention and 

has informed the German Government over a 

year ago that all prisoners of war entitled to 

repatriation under the convention should be 

 




returned to the custody of the United States 
r.egardless of nationality.... (2] 
Whoever these "appropriate American authorities" 
were, the historical record shows that other authori· 
ties prevailed, while Grew himself was soon eased out 
of the State Department by Dean Acheson. The 
Second KONR Division, which surrendered to the 
Americans at landau in Bavaria, was forcibJy repatri· 
ated from Plattling in the manner described .above 
after they had been repeatedly assur~ by.Col. Gillis, 
camp commandant, that such would not be their fate. 
When one of the American officers at Plattling 
accused the Russians in the ROA of being collabora­
tors, he was answered as follows: 
It was pJ e chance that during the war we found 
ourselves on territory held by the Germans and 
took up arms against the Soviet regime with 
German help. We wore German uniforms be­
cause we had no others, but our should er 
emblems of rank and the badge on our sleeve, 
the Russian St.. Andrew CroSS"; are all part of our 
country's age-old tradition. Our men are Rus· 
sians. We fought for a democratic ideal against 
the Communist tyranny now gripping our coun· 
try. We are fighting for a political idea and are 
not traitors or mercenaries. We had only one 
aim. The sacred aim of saving Russia. Had the 
Zulus fought against Stalin instead of the Ger· 
mans, we would have joined them because only 
one thing matters.,... to destroy Stalin and Com· 
munism.(3] 
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Meanwhile, the First KONR Division had side­
stepped into Czechoslovakia, turned on their German 
allies, and liberated Prague. T hey had done so in 
answer to the pleas which the Czech underground had 
addressed to the American forces under General 
Patton but which the Americans were unable to 
answer because they were being held back on orders 
from Eisenhower. Since the Red army was close 
behind the KONR troops, however, they quickly 
marched off to SchiUsselburg, Austria. Here they 
made contact with the American forces, Which 
disarmed them and then left them at the mercy of the 
advancing Red army, refusing to let the division flee 
through American lines. The unit disintegrated as its 
members either tried to escape as best they could 
with the Soviet commandos hunting them down, or 
else committed suicide. 
Two of Vlasov's generals, Meandrov and Maltzev, 
who had surrendered to the Americans, slit their 
wrists when they discovered they were going to be 
	 repatriated. They were rushed to hospitals and given 
expert treatment. After thl!y recovered, they were 
turned over to the Communists. Vlasov himself was 
being ·transferred to an American headquarters by an 
American convoy when a Red army detachment 
intercepted the convoy and removed Vlasov and his 
staff. The fact that the American escort offered no 
resistance le nds credence to the charge that the 
rendevous was prearranged. One year later, Izvestia 
announced that Vlasov a'nd all his major subordinates 
 
had been hanged. 
FATE OF THE COSSACKS 
The victims of Operation Keelhaul included not 
only soldiers wearing German uniforms, but also 
civilians, as the fate of the Cossacks illustrates. During 
the War; the German high command took a much 
more enthusiastic attitude towards enlisting the sup· 
port of those U.S.S.R. nationalities that it did not 
consider Slavic, and therefore Untermenschen. 
Among these were Georgians, T urkomens, Cauca· 
• sians, etc., but the primary beneficiaries were the 
Cossacks.( 4] Some 250,000 Cossacks joined the 
 German armies . fighting Stalin, including 80,000 
organized into the XV Cavalry Corps. When the 
German forces were slowly pushed out of Russia, not 
only did the Cossack troops withdraw, but large 
numbers from the Cossack nation went with them. 
The trek was long and arduous, but at the end of the 
war nearly 30,000 Cossacks-families, with many 
women, children, and ola men- had put themselves 
under the protection of the 11th British Armored 
Division near Leinz, Austria. They had been joined by 
many old Cossack emigres who. had left Russia during 
the Civil Wars from 1917 to 1920 and had since lived 
in 
r..v 
Yugoslavia or Germany. Most of the troops of the 
Cossack Cavalry Corps had already been repatri · 
ated at Judenburg, but the Cossacks at Leinz did not 
know this when, on May 28, 1945, the British 






physicians to attend a special conference with higher 
British officials. Over 2000 Cossack officers, inclu· 
ding the very aged Peter Krasnov, who had led the 
White armies allied with the British during the Civil 
War but had not been in Russia since, boarded a 
convoy of over 75 vehicles escorted by 25 Bren gun 
carriers, and thl!n were taken, not as they had been 
told to a conference, but to the waiting Soviets at 
Judenburg. Even the Communists were surprised to 
see among their prisoners General Krasnov and so 
many old emigres, and were very pleased at the 
unexpected opportunity to take vengeance on their 
old enemies. Krasnov and his associates, like Vlasov, 
were subsequently hanged. 
Back at Leinz, word of the fate of their officers 
and of the XV Corps had filtered back to the 
remaining Cossacks, who organized a passive resist· 
ance in which the soldiers and cadets would link arms 
and form a protective chain around t he older men, 
womel), and children. That is what they did at dawn 
on June 1st, when the camps were surrounded by 
British Bren gun carriers and armed troops. At a 
signal, the troops advanced into the crowd$ and began 
clubbing the Cossacks with rifle butts and batons. 
Those who tried to run away were shot in the feet 
and legs. The victims were thrown onto a convoy of 
waiting trucks, which took them to the nearby 
rail road siding. As each cattle-car was filled, it was 
bound shut with barbed wire and another car was 
loaded. Many tried to commit suicide aiong the banks 
of the Drava river. One woman, who was dragged out 
. downstream and revived, turned out to be a doctor 
who had earlier killed her daughter and mother with 
overdoses of morphine rather than let them suffer 
repatriation. Her second attempt at suicide suc­
ceeded. Isolated British troops, fearing for their lives 
in the melee, opened fire. The Bren gun carriers 
advanced to compress the crowds, and one woman 
threw her bab.Y and then herself under the tracks to 
be crushed. Two Cossack men approached a British 
officer and addressed him in Russian. As the officer 
asked his interpreter for a translation, both men slit 
their own throats and ; stumped to the ground, 
twitchihg and dying. "Our blood is on you and you r 
children," was the.translation of their statement. An 
engineer from Novotcherkassk shot his twelve-year· 
old son, his one-year·old daughter, his wife, and then 
himself. Hundreds killed themselves in various fash· 
ions. 
All day long the trucks drove between the camps 
and the railroad, and load after load was locked into 
the train. Toward evening, 60 freigt1·cars full started 
their journey to the U.S.S.R. Still more remained in 
the camps, b'Ut the British decided to cease efforts for 
the day. The follow ing' day the Cossacks received a 
respite, but on :June 3rd the·repatriations commenced· 
again:" There was a slight change of policy as this time 
the British finally decided to segregate those who had 
be;en Soviet citizens on September 1, 1939, from the 
old emigres and only repatriate the former. By the 
november 1974 
.. 
end of the 4th, the entire valley had been cleared of 
refugees; the repatri~~tinns were complete. 
EUROPEAN REPATRIATES ~ 
Citizens of Eastern European co tries (other than 
Russia) coming under Communist subjugation were 
also victims of Operation Keelhaul. he anti·Commu­
nist Croatfan Utashi, fleeing from Tito's partisans, 
were disarmed by the Bri~ish at Bleiburg in Austria 
and turned over to the Yugoslav dictator.[5} Several 
thousand Hungarians who had fought the advance of 
the Soviet armies retreated and surrendered to the 
Americans. They were repatriated to Budapest where 
many were publicly e~ecuted.[6} · 
As the dust settled on defeated Germany, the
..	 .· 
Allied armies started the huge task of herding 
together all the prisoners of war and refugees and 
concentrating them in OP1(Displaced Persons) camps. 
Many had in their possession Allied leaflets dropped 
from the air which branded as a lie the Nazi charges 
that prisoners would be shipped to Russia. Neverthe­
less, special repatriation teams of Allied and Soviet 
officials went through the camps questioning and 
screening in order to sort out all who might have been 
residents of the Soviet Union or the Eastern Europe· 
an countries. Those to be repatriated were sent to 
special camps which were policed by British and 
American troops under the supervision of Soviet 
officials, who insured that any anti-Communist 
propaganda or activity was suppressed. In Julyl1945, 
the operation of the DP camps was- t.ransferred"from 
the G·5 of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force) to UNRRA (United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration). Herbert 
Lehman and later Fiorella LaGuardia, as heads of 
UNRRA, assumed the task of forced repatriation 
with the same enthusiasm that they displayed when 
using UNRRA funds to finance the solidification of 
the Lublin Gang's hold on Poland. 
Ghinghis Guirey, an American on one of the 
screening teams, reported: 
The most· unpleasant aspect of this unpleasant 
business was the fear these people displayed. 
Involuntarily one began to look over one's 
shoulder. I heard so many threa~ to commit 
suicide from people who feared repatriation that 
it became almost commonplace. And they were 
not fooling. [7) 
Another observer, a priest, confirmed the attempts at 
suicide when the day for repatriation came at the DP 
camp at Dachau: · · 
' In Oachau, where there were no prisoners of war 
but just ordinary d,eportees, Ostarbeiter, Ameri· 
cans ordered them handcuffed in order to tuni 
them over more conveniently. The unfortuniue 
men, driven \ to desperation, smashed window 
panes with their heads and cut their throats with 
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glass. They managed somehow to set fire to one 

of their barracks and threw themselves into the 

flames, having first soaked themselves in spilled 

gasoline.- Ten otth men were burned to death. 






Another report about Oachau was carried in the Stars 
and Stri'pes for January 26, 1946: 
" It just wasn't human," one guard said. "The 
, 	 G.l.'s quickly cut down those who hanged 
thef"(lselves from rafters. Those who were still 
conscious were screaming in Russian, pointing 
first a' the guns of the guards and then at 
themselves, begging·to be shot." 
"Even when we were try ing to help and send 

them to hospitals they refused to live. One had 

stabbed himself in the chest and seemed almost 

out when we put him on a litter and loaded him 

onto a truck. Every time he moved blood 

spurted from the wound. Two MP's could not 

subdue him. Two of them· broke their billies 

hitting him on the head." [9} 

Such horror scenes wer~ the rule in L) ndreds of \ . 
other DP camp's all over Germany, 1t.:i";, France, 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. In fact, Operation 
Keelhaul even reached the 'United States. Many 
Russians were brought as prisoners of war to camps 
chiefly in ldahd. At the end of the war, they were all 
boarded on Soviet ships at Seattle and Portland 
except for almost 200 who had put UR. tl)e most 
violent resistance and were instead move"d to Fort 
Oix, N.J. There, another attempt was made to 
repatriate them in w'hich the MP's used, tear-gas. The 
three who committed suicide are buried . in the 
National ·Cemetery at Salem, N.J. The remainder, 
when forced aboard the Soviet vessel, rioted and 
dismantled the ship's engines with their bare hands. 
The ship could not leave port, ·so the. Russian 
prisoners were returned to Fort Oix. Finally, the 
American authorities made a third attempt at repatri · 
ation by surreptitously mixing barbiturates into the 
prisoners' coffee and loading them on a Soviet ship 
while they were unconscious. The third attempt 
succeeded. 
The r.nany Polish officers serving in Italy with Polish 
units loyal to the Mikolajczyk government in exile in 
England committed suicide when they realized that 
they would be repatriated to the authority of Stalin's 
Lublin Gang. 
In short, the Allied armies tracked down everyone 
who could conceivably be construed as a Russian or 
Eastern European citizen-men, women,.and children, 
soldiers and civilians, · those who had fought with 
Germany and th~ who had fought against Germany 
-collected them together and brutally handed 'them 
over to Stalin and his minions. It is estimated that 
reason 7 
between two to five million victirns were in~olvedl 
The excuse of tho$e who participated in and executed 
o'peration Keelhaul was that they were "acting i;inder 
orders," that forced repatriation was required by the 
Yalta Agreement. However. 8$ Epstein conclusively 
demonstrates, the Yalta Agreements; while calling for 
a system ()f repatriation;· said absolutely nothing 
about the use of force, and furthermore, Operation 
Keelhaul was already in full swing in June 1944, eight 
months prior to Yalta. 
' 
WHO WAS TO BLAME? 
Welch and Huxley-Blythe, in their previous ac· 
counts, have asserted that the ind ividual bearing the 
primary responsibility for originating and implement· 
ing Operation Keelhaul was the commander of 
SHAE F, Genera l Eisenhower. Epstein avoids making 
any final assessment of guilt, but much of his 
evidence s upports and none of it contradicts those 
accusing ·Eisenhower. Whatever Eisenhower's initial 
c ulpabi lity, it was certainly compounded by the 
distortions of the truth about the affair that he 
published in his book, Crusaae in Europe: 
These policies and agreementS [Yalta] we first 
tried to apply without deviation, but we qu ickly 
saw that their_...rigid application wou ld often 
violate the fundamental humanitarian principles 
we espoused. Thereafter we gave any indiv idual 
who objected to · return the benefit of the 
doubt. [10] 
Incidents at the DP camps in Rimini and Pisa in Italy · 
indicate that Operation Keelhaul W/lS still being 
enforced at least as la.te as,1947, long after Eisenhow. 
er had moved up from SHAEF to the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. · 
The reason, of course, that the responsib ility for 
Operation Keelhaul remains so obscure is that all the 
relevant documents still remain locked up and inac· 
cessi.ble. Three volumes of records; entitled "Forcible' 
Repatriation of Displaced Soviet Citizens-Operation 
Keelhaul," were classified Top Secret by the U.S. 
Army on September 18, 1948,.and bear the secret file 
number 383.7·14. 1. Other documents are being held 
under .wraps in the UNRRA Archives by the U.N. 
Seeretariat and in the British Archives by the British 
Government. Epstein, who earlier. was instrumental in 
uncovering the truth about the Katyn Forest massa­
c.re, has been attempting for 20 years, . since 1954, to 
get the . veil of secrecy removed from· the Keelhaul 
documents. So far, h is efforts, including a suit under 
the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, have 
proven fru itless: 
Consequently, the account in Epstein's book is far 
from complete and even slightly disjointed. He has 
pieced together reports from partic ipants, eyewit · 
nesses, and 5urviving victims to give a few incidents 
and Jhen fitted them into a narrative that brings 
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. ~Italian, and W~ German Governments up to the 
·{fi1o incident involving Kodirka, the Lithuanian 
seaman;· and relates the entire issue to international 
law and the Geneva Convention. He concludes that 
forced repatriation, under any circumstances, is a 
"crime against humanity, violating international law 
and humanitarian principles." [ 1 1) Although a truly 
comprehensive account of Operation Keelhaul will 
probably have to await the release of the official 
documents, Epstein has certainly performed a great 
service by publishing a book, the first exclusively 
devoted to the subject, that may finally bring 
Operation Keelhaul to the attention of the American 
public. 
IMPLICATIONS 
To libertarians, Operation K!!elhaul is significant 
for two reasons. First, it represents an instructive case 
study of the fantastic power that even a supposed ly 
democratic state can ruthlessly wield during wartime. 
Not only were the Allied governments able to 
perpetrate the crime, but afterwards, they were able 
to impose what Harry Elmer Barnes has appropriately 
called an "historical blackout" so effective that it 
lasted for nearly '30 years. Secondly, it is a chilling 
comment on the motives of those who ran the u:s. 
Go~ernment at the time and, by implication, on those 
who run it now. It is fashionable, even among 
libertarians, to laugh off ' e)(planations which ascribe 
evi l and deceitfu l (as opposed to well-meaning but 
misguided) motives to our political masters in Wash· 
ington as "conspiracy theory. " However, no one has 
yet produced a satisfactory explanation of · how 
Operation Keelhaul resulted from misguided idealism 
or liberal b lindness, It seems, at least to me, that any 
explanation that falls short of including clandestine 
Soviet-American collusion at some level is obviously 
inadequate. 
Be that as it may, it is interesting in conclusion to 
observe that the Soviets do not share the U.S . 
Gove rnment's reticence about publicizing Keelhau.l. 
When the U.S.S. R. Government released several hun­
dred survivors of forced repatriation in 1955-after 
10 years in Siberian slave-labor camps-a Russian 
newspaper carried the follow ing: 
We have let "them" out [referring to the old 
Cossack emigres] and we have forgiven "our 
own" [referring to the Vlasov soldiers] . 
Whether they were Vlasov men or prisoners of 
war who did not want to return to the mother· 
land does not matter 'now. All their sins have 
been forgiven . . 
But the English and American bayonets, trun· 
cheons, machine guns and tanks used against 
them will never be forgotten. 
No Russian will ever fo rget Lienz, Dachau , 
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Plattling, Toronto, and other places of extradi· 

tion, including New York. And they must never 

be forgotten. It is a lesson all Russians must 

learn well. For it shows that you cannot trust 

the capitalist st~tes in the future. [12) Iii 
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SOtZHMITSYN"S 1 TISJ1Ui~NT 

John Hospers 
George St. George opens his much publicized book 
Siberia (David McKay Co., ,1969) with an account of 
his childhood in the central Siberian city of Irkutsk 
during czarist days. Among other things, he tells how 
political prisoners were shipped from European Rus­
sia to exile and sometimes imprisonment in Irkutsk, 
and he expresses relief that a far more humane regime 
has now replaced that of the czars, and that such · 
things no longer take place. When I was in Irkutsk a 
few months after read ing this book in 1971, I could 
~ traces of czarist days, especially in the architec· 
ture, but of cou rse I saw no caravllns of prisoners; 
nonetheless, since I had also read other books (such 
as Dallin and· Nikolaevsky's Forced Labor ·in Soviet 
Russia) I was far from convinced of the trutl'l of St. 
George's account. 
Solzhenitsyn's book The Gulag Arch'ipelago (the 
archipelago being .the "islands" of slave labor camps 
scattered across the length of Russia, and "Gulag" 
being the acronym for. "Chief Administration of 
Corrective Labor Camps") explodes the St. George 
myth once and for all. Not that it hadn't already been 
exploded by such books as The Great Teffor, a 
scholarly and extensively dOOJmented account by 
Robert Conquest; bot Solzhenitsyn's work has a 
special authenticity: it was written within Russia 
Contributing editorJohn Hosptn is a profeswr ofph/liJ«>. 
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itself, partly from his own experiences (he spent 
eleven years in Soviet labor camps, which he survived, 
as he says, only because most of the time was spent in 
a specia l place of· detention for engineers, such as he 
describes in The First Circle, where conditions were 
better than in other prisons) but mostly from the 
experien~s of others-accounts gleaned from other 
prisoners (usually cross·checked .for accuracy) and 
some from underground publications and other 
GU LAG ARCHIPELAGO. By Alaksandr I. Solzhenit­
syn. New York: Harper & Row. 1974. 660 pp. 
$12.50/$1.95. 
sources which reached him, which he cannot yet 
reveal without incriminating the sources. 
His account is devastating. People and places and 
dates are named; he spares the reader no detail of 
horror, until from time to t ime one must lay the 
book aside in revulsion that such things actually 
occurred. But in addition to the relentless accumula· 
tion of factual detai ls, We also learn firsthand what it 
feels like to be arrested, interrogated, tortured, sent 
oH in the night to destinations unknown. T he impact 
is overwhelming; and the upshot of the account is 
that conditions in the USSR have been far more 
terrible than even in the worst days of the czars. 
.If the intellectuals in the plays of Chekhov who 
spent all their time guessing what would h11ppen 
in twenty, thirty, or fortY'v.ears hjtd been told 
that in forty years interrOgnttfn by torture 
wou ld be practiced in Russia; that prisoners 
would have their skulls squeezed with iron rings; 
that a human being" would be lowered into an 
acid bi!th; that tl)ey would be trussed up naked 
· to be bitten r nts and bedbugs; that a ramrod 
reason 9 
